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3 Functioning of the New Cooperative Mechanisms 
	



















































































































































































































































































































5 Reflections and Recommendations 
	
While	the	new	mechanism	under	Article	6.4-6.7	seems	familiar	as	its	principles	strongly	
resemble	the	Kyoto	Protocol’s	CDM,	the	other	two	approaches	have	so	far	not	been	
clearly	defined	conceptually.	Consequently,	submissions	on	the	new	mechanism	go	into	
implementation	details	whereas	submissions	on	the	other	two	approaches	mostly	try	to	
define	what	the	two	approaches	are.	The	submissions	reveal	some	sharp	differences	in	
opinions	on	how	Art.	6	should	work.	Key	controversies	include:	
• what	to	include	under	and	how	to	govern	cooperative	approaches;	
• the	scope	of	the	Article	6.4	mechanism;	
• how	to	operationalize	the	requirement	to	increase	ambition;	
• whether	to	have	international	provisions	on	the	promotion	of	sustainable	
development	
• how	to	protect	environmental	integrity.	
	
As	for	the	governance	of	cooperative	approaches,	the	history	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	has	
shown	that	self-policing	by	Parties	does	not	necessarily	work.	One	part	of	Joint	
Implementation,	the	so-called	Track	1,	operated	without	international	oversight	and	
research	has	concluded	that	a	large	share	of	the	emission	credits	issued	under	this	track	
	
23	Brazilian	submission	(n.	9);	EIG	submission	(n.	8).	
24	AOSIS	submission	(n.	11);	Brazilian	submission	(n.	9);	LDC	submission	(n.	8).,	
Submission	by	the	Bolivarian	Republic	of	Venezuela	
Views	on	article	6	of	the	Paris	Agreement,	March	2017.	
	 11	
are	unlikely	to	represent	additional	emissions	reductions.25	It	therefore	seems	
recommendable	to	follow	the	position	of	those	countries	who	insist	that	transfers	under	
Article	6.2	must	be	subject	to	robust	international	oversight.	
The	question	of	raising	ambition	could	be	addressed	at	the	level	of	the	NDCs	or	at	the	
level	of	the	Article	6	activities.	An	increase	of	ambition	is	most	pronounced	if	Article	6	is	
used	to	go	beyond	existing	NDCs,	rather	than	only	to	achieve	them.	For	example,	the	EU	
has	set	itself	the	target	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	by	at	least	40%	below	1990	levels	by	
2030.	The	EU	so	far	intends	to	achieve	the	40%	target	by	domestic	reductions;	Article	6	
could	be	used	to	achieve	further	emission	reductions	in	third	countries.	
Additional	reductions	could	also	be	achieved	at	the	level	of	individual	Article	6	activities	
by	discounting	a	share	of	the	reductions	achieved.	In	this	way,	only	a	part	of	the	
reductions	would	be	available	to	buyers	to	use	towards	their	NDCs.		
While	the	question	of	international	assessment	of	sustainable	development	impacts	is	
highly	charged	politically,	experience	from	the	CDM	indicates	that	leaving	the	matter	to	
host	countries	is	a	questionable	approach.	Research	has	identified	substantial	flaws	in	
national	processes	to	assess	the	sustainability	of	projects.	It	therefore	seems	
recommendable	to	include	sustainability	issues	in	the	international	process	to	approve	
activities	for	Article	6.	The	CDM	does	actually	have	a	tool	to	assess	sustainability	impacts	
in	place,	but	its	use	is	so	far	voluntary.	This	tool	could	provide	a	solid	basis	for	
developing	mandatory	criteria	for	activities	under	Article	6.	In	addition,	there	should	be	
clear	procedures	for	when	and	how	to	consult	local	stakeholders	as	well	as	grievance	
mechanisms	to	allow	stakeholders	to	raise	complaints.	
The	protection	of	environmental	integrity	faces	various	risks,	including	lack	of	
additionality,	double	counting,	overselling,	lack	of	robust	accounting	due	to	the	variety	
of	NDCs,	and	an	abasement	of	mitigation	ambition	in	order	to	maximise	the	potential	to	
sell	emission	units.	
As	for	the	variety	of	NDCs,	while	a	number	of	countries	demand	to	allow	all	countries	to	
use	Article	6,	this	may	not	be	possible.	Emission	intensity	targets	and	emission	targets	
expressed	as	a	deviation	from	‘business	as	usual’	pose	substantial	accounting	challenges,	
as	do	targets	that	are	defined	only	for	a	single	year.26	
As	for	the	risk	that	countries	might	keep	their	mitigation	ambition	low	in	order	to	
maximise	the	potential	to	sell	emission	units,	it	seems	recommendable	not	to	translate	
emission	targets	into	budgets	of	emission	units	as	was	done	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	
The	Kyoto	experience	shows	that	such	budgets	are	quickly	seen	as	acquired	possessions.	
Further	discussions	should	also	explore	whether	the	determination	of	the	additionality	
and	baselines	of	individual	Article	6	activities	could	be	completely	decoupled	from	
NDCs.	
The	additionality	problem	has	arguably	not	been	really	resolved	in	the	CDM	and	JI	and	
the	rapid	technological	advances	in	key	technologies	such	as	renewable	energy	will	not	
	
25	Kollmuss,	A.,	L.	Schneider,	V.	Zhezherin	(2015):	 Has	Joint	Implementation	reduced	
GHG	emissions?	Lessons	learned	for	the	design	of	carbon	market	mechanisms.	
Stockholm:	Stockholm	Environment	Institute.	
26	Schneider,	L.,	A.	Kollmuss,	M.	Lazarus	(2014):	Addressing	the	Risk	of	Double	Counting	
Emission	Reductions	under	the	UNFCCC’.	Stockholm:	Stockholm	Environment	Institute;	
Kreibich,	N.,	W.	Obergassel	(2016):	Carbon	Markets	After	Paris—How	to	Account	for	the	
Transfer	of	Mitigation	Results?	Wuppertal:	Wuppertal	Institute	for	Climate,	
Environment	and	Energy.		
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make	demonstrating	the	additionality	of	individual	projects	easier.	At	the	same	time,	in	
aggregate	the	transition	to	renewable	energy	is	clearly	not	going	as	fast	as	it	could	and	
should	be.	To	stay	below	the	2°C	limit,	more	than	US$	1	trillion	will	need	to	be	invested	
annually	in	the	energy	sector	alone	through	to	2050.	At	the	moment,	only	about	one	
quarter	of	this	is	being	invested	annually.27		
Moving	the	implementation	level	from	the	project	to	the	sector	level,	as	is	being	
discussed	for	the	Article	6.4	mechanism,	may	help	to	overcome	the	difficulty	to	establish	
additionality.	Taking	the	example	of	renewable	energy,	national	scenarios	for	business	
as	usual	could	be	used	to	analyse	why	the	national	uptake	of	renewable	energy	is	slower	
than	might	be	expected	given	the	rapidly	falling	technology	costs.	On	this	basis,	a	
threshold	for	the	expansion	of	renewables	could	be	defined,	where	further	expansion	
beyond	the	threshold	would	be	defined	as	being	additional.	The	analysis	might	also	
identify	certain	technologies	as	generally	being	too	expensive	or	otherwise	unattractive	
in	the	respective	national	context.		
Opening	Article	6	for	national-level	design	options	would	also	allow	to	harness	national	
policies	for	climate	change	mitigation.	Article	6	could	be	used	to	support	national	policy	
instruments	that	have	already	proven	to	be	highly	effective	in	mobilizing	private	
investment	for	renewable	energy,	such	as	feed-in	tariffs,	auctions,	and	quota	systems.	
For	instance,	investors	could	top	up	national	FIT	levels	or	auction	volumes.	In	this	way,	
Article	6	could	be	used	to	help	catalyse	sector-wide	transformations,	which	will	be	very	
difficult	to	do	with	a	project-by-project	approach.	
	
	
	
27	Ceres,	‘Investing	in	the	Clean	Trillion:	Closing	The	Clean	Energy	Investment	Gap’,	
https://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/investing-clean-trillion-closing-clean-
energy-investment-gap.	
